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KANT ON GOD, EVIL, AND TELEOLOGY1
Derk Pereboom

In his mature period Kant maintained that human beings have never
devised a theory that shows how the existence of God is compatible with
the evil that actually exists. But he also held that an argument could be
developed that we human beings might well not have the cognitive capacity to understand the relation between God and the world, and that therefore the existence of God might nevertheless be compatible with the evil
that exists. At the core of Kant's position lies the claim that God's relation
to the world might well not be purposive in the way we humans can genuinely understand such a relation. His strategy involves demonstrating
that the teleological argument is unsound - for this argument would establish that the relation between God and the world is purposive in a way we
can grasp - and showing that by way of a Spinozan conception we can catch
an intellectual glimpse of an alternative picture of the relation between God
and the world.

I

In his early period Kant maintained that the problem of evil can be
solved by virtue of the fact that all apparent evils contribute to the
greater good of the whole. 2 Later in life, however, he became more pessimistic about the prospects of explaining how God and evil might coexist. Thus in his 1791 article on the problem of evil, "On the Miscarriage
of all Philosophical Trials in Theodicy" ("Uber das Mifilingen aller
philosophischen Versliche in der Theodizee"), he contends that no adequate
theodicy has ever been devised.' But here Kant does not resolve that the
problem of evil defeats theism.; Rather, he argues that legitimacy of
belief in God can be rescued by a theodicy of ignorance-by showing
that we lack the cognitive capacity to grasp the relation between God
and the world of experience.
In the article on theodicy, Kant characterizes the threat to divine
moral goodness as arising from the counterpurposive (das Zweckwidrige);
"by 'theodicy' we understand the defense of the highest wisdom of the
creator against the charge that reason brings against it for whatever is
counterpurposive in the world" (Ak VIII 255). What underlies this characterization is the view that this threat results from evils that do not
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seem compatible with the existence of God as a being who purposively
designs and preserves the universe. Kant draws the conclusion that we
cannot explain how the evils of this world can be reconciled with a God
conceived in the ordinary way. But he then argues that there is still a
means to rescue the legitimacy of theistic belief. This approach involves
showing that the relation between God and the world of experience
might well not be as it is ordinarily conceived.
Kant's hope is that although consideration of the evils in the universe
would discredit belief in a God who is purposive in the way that we
comprehend it, such reflection might well not undermine belief in a God
who is related to the world in a different way. He contends that we cannot genuinely comprehend any such different relationship. But he also
maintains that he can establish that our inability to understand could
well be due to a limitation in our understanding, and not necessarily to
the impossibility of an alternative relationship. This creates logical room
for the hypothesis that God is related to the world in a way that preserves divine goodness, and thereby helps allow for legitimacy of theistic belief in the face of the problem of evil.
To understand the implications of Kant's focus on the counterpurposive requires that we examine his treatment of divine purposiveness in the
Critique of Judgment, a work he had completed shortly before composing
the essay on theodicy. In his discussion of divine purposiveness both
there and in the essay on theodicy Kant places himself within the dialectical framework of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.s The three
main characters of the Dialogues are Cleanthes, who argues, with Newton
and Boyle, that the apparent purposiveness and design in the universe
provides the basis for a successful proof of an author of nature who has
purposes in the sense that humans do, but who is much more impressive;
Philo, perhaps Hume's own representative, who is skeptical about this
teleological argument but agrees that the hypothesis that the author of
nature in some remote sense resembles the human mind provides the best
explanation we have for apparent purposiveness and design; and finally
Demea, often thought to be a stand-in for Leibniz or Clarke, who rejects
the teleological argument, claiming that it unfortunately makes the divine
anthropomorphic, and instead advances a cosmological argument for the
existence of God. Kant's stance on the nature of God and on the teleological argument (but not on the cosmological argument) is Demea's. Like
Demea, Kant suggests that God is not purposive in the way that we are-as a successful teleological argument would make him out to be--and for
both figures this generates an interest in undermining the teleological
argument. And Kant agrees with Demea that because our cognitive
capacities are limited, we cannot understand God's relation to the world
well enough to be justified in concluding that the existence of evil undermines the legitimacy of belief in God.
By contrast with Demea, however, Kant actually devises an argument
for the claim that our cognitive capacities are too limited to grasp the
relation between God and the world of experience. This feature makes
Kant's theodicy much more interesting than those that merely assert
without argument that we cannot understand God's ways. Without an
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argument to support this sort of claim such a theodicy would be very
weak. One could make an assertion analogous to Demea's whenever
one's views contain an apparent inconsistency: "You've pointed our an
apparent inconsistency that I cannot explain away, but if we were only
more intelligent, we would see how it could be done." Such an assertion
counts for little unless it is accompanied by good reasons for thinking
that we lack the requisite capacity.
To comprehend how a theodicy of ignorance could possibly undergird the legitimacy of belief in God one must understand the type of justification for such belief Kant has in mind. The sort of justification he
defends is practical. In Kant's terminology, justification for theistic
belief is a function of practical and not of theoretical reason. In fact, central to his theological views in his mature period is the claim that there is
no successful theoretical argument for the existence of God. Rather, the
belief that God exists is justified because it is required for the possibility
of living a moral life. In his Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone
(1793) (GH 3-7, Ak VI 6-8), Kant contends that given how human beings
are psychologically constituted, we must view our actions as aiming at
an end, although this end need not function as a reason for action. So
although for us moral action does not require an end as a reason for
action, we must have a conception of an end towards which our moral
action is directed. This end is the highest good-that rational beings be
virtuous and that they be happy in accordance with their virtue (Ak V
110-113)-and for the possibility of the realization of this end, "we must
postulate a higher, moral, most holy, and omnipotent being ... ". Kant
also intimates that failure to believe that the highest good is an end that
can be realized would constitute "a hindrance to moral decision." He
seems to suggest that if the virtuous lived miserable lives without any
hope of happiness, and if they believed that their efforts could not help
to realize a moral universe, then a sense of sadness or frustration would
undermine their moral motivation.
The theme that without a belief in God moral motivation would be
undermined figures prominently in the account of the moral argument
for theism in the Critique of Judgment:
Alternatively, suppose that, regarding [the highest good] too,
[the righteous man] wants to continue to adhere to the call of his
inner moral vocation, and that he does not want his respect for
the moral law, by which this law directly inspires him to obey it,
to be weakened, as would result from the nullity of the one ideal
final purpose that is adequate to this respect's high demand
(such weakening of his respect would inevitably impair his
moral attitude): In that case he must-from a practical point of
view, i.e., so that he can at least form a concept of the possibility
of [achieving] the final purpose that is morally prescribed to
him-assume the existence of a moral author of the world, i.e.,
the existence of a God; and he can indeed make this assumption,
since it is at least not intrinsically contradictory. (Ak V 452-3)
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The last sentence of this passage intimates that for Kant there is a
requirement that any practically justified belief must satisfy: it must be
free from logical contradiction, whether it be internal self-contradiction
or contradiction with other beliefs we hold. 6 What underlies this stricture, in Kant's conception, is that the law of non-contradiction holds for
reason generally, not just for theoretical reason. This position is
expressed in his view that we need to resolve not only the antinomies
(apparent contradictions) for theoretical reason (A 405/B432ff), but also
the antinomy for practical reason (Ak V 113-4). Perhaps at a deeper
level, the fact that the law of non-contradiction holds for both kinds of
reason stems from their being fundamentally one faculty; "it is one and
the same reason which judges a priori by principles, whether for theoretical or for practical purposes" (Ak V 121).
Seeing that for Kant practically justified belief must satisfy the law of
non-contradiction is crucial for comprehending his project in theodicy.
If practically justified belief were exempt from this condition there
would be no point to establishing the absence of logical conflict between
the existence of God and the evils in the world. Only adequate pragmatic reasons for theistic belief would then be needed. It is important to
note that, in Kant's view, showing that belief in God involves no logical
contradiction does not amount to establishing that God is a really possible being (A602/B630).7 On my reading, showing that God is a really
possible being requires demonstrating that the divine nature involves
neither logical nor causal impossibility." By contrast, showing that belief
in God meets the law of non-contradiction demands establishing only
that in some conception of God, and just insofar as that conception is
available to us, there is nothing contradictory or that contradicts other
beliefs we hold. This lower standard is the one Kant attempts to satisfy
in his project in theodicy.
II

At the beginning of "On the Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials in
Theodicy" Kant divides the counterpurposive into three categories (Ak
VIII 256-7). The first is "the absolutely counterpurposive, or what cannot be condoned or desired either as ends or means. He designates this
category "the morally counterpurposive, evil proper (sin)." The second
type of counterpurposive feature is "the conditionally counterpurposive,
or what can indeed never co-exist with the wisdom of a will as an end,
yet can do so as a means." Kant designates this category "the physically
counterpurposive, ill (pain)." The third category concerns "the disproportion between crimes and penalties in the world."
The first category of the counterpurposive provides the basis of for
questioning "the holiness of the author of the world, as lawgiver." This
challenge claims that there actually exist actions that are of a general sort
absolutely prohibited by the moral law, such as killing an innocent person, but nonetheless count as God's blameworthy actions. The second
category yields a challenge to God's "goodness, as ruler" which contends
that God inexcusably allows ills or pains to transpire. These ills or pains
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are not of general sorts absolutely prohibited by the moral law, since it is
conceivable that certain of their instances be morally justified as means
to ends. But the second challenge argues that instances of ills or pains
actually occur that cannot in fact be justified in this way. The third category of the counterpurposive provides the foundation for contesting
God's "his justice, as judge." According to this last challenge, God does
not distribute punishments and rewards appropriately (Ak VIII 257). To
each one of these charges Kant claims there are three responses, that is,
three theodicies, all of which he rejects."
Of the three theodicies that defend the holiness of God, the first is
familiar: that which we judge to be counterpurposive is judged by
divine wisdom in accordance with rules different from those of our reason. These rules are incomprehensible to us and
what we with right find reprehensible with reference to our
practical reason and its determination might yet perhaps be in
relation to the divine ends and the highest wisdom precisely the
most fitting means to our particular welfare and the greatest
good of the world as well. (Ak VIII 258)
According to this theodicy, we make mistakes when we judge effects in
the world to be counterpurposive, because "we judge what is law only
relatively to human beings in this life to be so absolutely." For example,
the killing of an innocent person might seem morally wrong relative to
human interests, but relative to divine ends and the divine wisdom it
might be "the most fitting means to our particular welfare and the greatest good of the world" (Ak VIII 258).
Kant is merciless in his rejection of this theodicy: "this apology, in
which the vindication is far worse than the complaint, needs no refutation; surely it can be freely given over to the detestation of every human
being who has the least feeling for morality" (Ak VIII 258). Consider a
case of genocide that has taken place in human history, and suppose
that God could have prevented it from happening with comparatively
insignificant effort or cost. If a human being could prevent the genocide
with comparatively insignificant effort or cost we would judge him
heinously evil if he failed to prevent it. The theodicy at issue claims that
God should not be judged heinously evil for failing to prevent this moral
evil, because he can see that this course of action is in accordance with
the divine moral law after all, perhaps because it is "the most fitting
means to our particular welfare and the greatest good of the world."
But in Kant's view, it is obvious that this sort of claim is fundamentally
at odds with the truth about morality. Among other things, divine policy in this example threatens to incur a violation of the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, "act in such a way that you always
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any
other, never merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end"
(Ak IV 429). Kant maintains that the proposed alternative just could not
be a genuinely moral law.
Utilitarians might reason differently about such a case. Although
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they would deny that seeking "the most fitting means to our particular
welfare and the greatest good of the world" could ever be immoral, they
would contend that it is thoroughly implausible that not preventing the
genocide actually conforms to this aim. Failure to keep the genocide
from happening for the sake of some greater good would be judged
immoral not on the grounds that it treats persons merely as a means to
some end, but because it is so thoroughly unlikely that it is the utilitymaximizing strategy. But Kant cannot avail himself of such reasoning.
Moreover, his endorsement of the Categorical Imperative, the second
formulation in particular, places a stringent limitation on the kinds of
theodicies he can accept. Many traditional theodicies argue that God's
goodness is compatible with various evils because they can be understood as means to greater goods. But Kant's ethical theory cannot allow
such theodicies if the method for securing the greater goods involves
using people merely as means. Evils involving the killing of human
beings, if perpetrated as a means to a greater good, will typically, if not
always be ruled out as immoral in the Kantian view.
The second theodicy in the first group-those that aim to vindicate
God against the charge of sin-does profess to allow for moral evil, by
contrast with the first theodicy, but "it would excuse the author of the
world on the ground that it could not be prevented, because founded on
the limitations of human beings as finite" (Ak VIII 258-9). Kant envisions this theodicy to specify that the alleged moral evils do not result
from God's acting in violation of the moral law, but rather they issue
inevitably from human nature. His reply is that such a theodicy would
transfer the evil out of the category of moral evils, since "it could not be
attributed to human beings as something for which they are to be
blamed." Kant is not arguing that this theodicy shows how God can be
justified in the face of evil, but rather that if this second account of the
counterpurposive is correct, it would qualify as ill or pain and not as sin.
The final theodicy in the first group is that the counterpurposive is
moral evil and the guilt for it rests on human beings, "yet no guilt may
be ascribed to God, for God has merely tolerated it for just causes as a
deed of human beings: in no way has he condoned it, willed or promoted it..." (Ak VIII 259). Although God could have prevented human evil
choices, he is justified in tolerating them, for instance on the grounds
that a greater good is realized by his toleration than would be achieved
by his prevention.
Kant's response is that this theodicy also takes the counterpurposive
outside of the realm of moral evil:
since even for God it was impossible to prevent this evil without
doing violence to higher and even moral ends elsewhere, the
ground of this ill (for so we must now truly call it) must
inevitably be sought in the essence of things, specifically in the
necessary limitations of humanity as a finite nature, which cannot be accounted to it (mithin ihr auch nicht zurechnet werden
konne) (Ak VIII 259).
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In Kant's conception, human beings are limited because among the factors that move them are inclinations-motivating factors that result from
anticipation of pleasure or displeasure (Ak V 23-6). We would never act
immorally if it weren't for inclinations that motivate us to act in ways
that are discordant with the moral law. By contrast, the actions of a holy
will-one that does not have inclinations to wrestle with-would necessarily be in harmony with the moral law (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of
Morals, Ak IV 414). Nevertheless, humans can be blameworthy for
wrongdoing despite the fact that without inclinations we would never
do wrong. In his Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone Kant explains
how this can be. Blameworthiness does not reside in our being responsible for our inclinations "for since they are implanted in us, we are not
their authors" (GH 30, Ak VI 34). Rather, what we can control in a way
sufficient to generate moral responsibility is which of two sorts of incentives to action, the moral law and inclination, we subordinate to the
other. Blameworthy wrongdoing in human beings results from making
"the incentive of self-love and its inclinations the condition of obedience
to the moral law" (GH 32, Ak VI 36).
In view of these considerations, Kant's response to the third theodicy
is best construed in this way: Although we can be blameworthy for our
actions, we nevertheless cannot be held responsible for the fact that we
have inclinations, which are in an important sense the grounds for our
wrongdoing. Our having inclinations does not result from any moral
evil on our part. The theodicy under consideration argues that God has
reason for tolerating our evil choices. But if evil choices would not have
been made without inclinations, the theodicy is driven back to providing
reason why God has given us these inclinations. Consequently, this
theodicy must transfer what from its point of view is the most salient
aspect of the counterpurposive out of the realm of moral evil and into
the area of ills required for a greater good. This strategy therefore places
this crucial aspect of the counterpurposive in the purview of the second
group of theodicies.
Kant's reasoning here is to the point. Indeed, many theists claim that
God is justified in tolerating free choices for evil because such toleration
realizes a greater good. But it is then natural to ask why humans have
been given such strong inclinations for evil choices, without which they
would likely not be motivated to make them. These inclinations include
a desire to dominate others that appears to exceed any social benefit,
and a tendency to take pleasure in the pain of others. The kind of theodicy that this reflection occasions must specify the good realized by our
having been given such inclinations, and this sort falls not into the first,
but into the next group Kant considers.
III

The theodicies in the second group attempt to defend God against the
charge that he has allowed too many ills or pains in the world, "what
can indeed never co-exist with the wisdom of a will as an end, yet can
do so as a means" (Ak VIII 256). The first theodicy in this category
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claims that "it is false to assume in human fates a preponderance of ill
over the pleasant enjoyment of life, for however bad someone's lot, yet
everyone would rather live than be dead" (Ak VIII 259). After considering some caveats for those who commit suicide, Kant responds:
But surely the reply to this sophistry may be left to the sentence
of every human being of sound mind who has lived and pondered over the value of life long enough to pass judgment, when
asked, on whether he had any inclination to play the game of
life once more, I do not say in the same circumstances but in any
other he pleases (provided they are not of a fairy world but of
this earthly world of ours). (Ak VIII 259)
Presumably Kant believes that any human being of sound mind would
not have any inclination to live an earthly life once more, even if the circumstances were better than those of his or her actual life.
Whether Kant is right about this is a matter for an empirical investigation, but it is hard to imagine that his claim would be supported.
However, while it is implausible that anyone of sound mind would not
want to live an earthly life again, it certainly does not seem far-fetched
to suppose that a tenth of sound-minded humanity currently alive
would not to. This is not to say that these people would claim that their
lives were not worth living, but only that the pains an earthly life
involves would make the prospect of another such life unattractive
enough to make them want to avoid living this sort of life again. And
this fact would be sufficient to provide a problem for the existence of
God. For if God is good, one would expect him to make human lives in
general more pleasurable than painful, or at least so pleasurable as to
result in everyone wanting to live another life.
The second theodicy in this group offers a reply to this worry: that the
preponderance of pain over pleasure is characteristic of the nature of a
human being, and thus, if God is to create human beings at all, pain will
dominate over pleasure in our lives. Kant's response is that "if that is
the way it is, then another question arises, namely why the creator of
our existence called us into life when the latter, in our correct estimate, is
not desirable to us" (Ak VIII 260). To my mind, this reply is not especially powerful, since people might well think their lives worth living
despite the preponderance of pain over pleasure. What is more implausible about the second theodicy is the claim that human nature carries
with it this balance of pain and pleasure. Surely God might have made
us less susceptible to physical and psychological problems than we are.
After all, some people are not seriously affected by serious physical or
psychological difficulties in their lifetimes, so it isn't part of human
nature that we be so afflicted.
The third of these theodicies contends that we only become worthy
for future glory "precisely through our struggle with adversities" (Ak
VIII 260). But, replies Kant, we could never understand why future
glory would require perseverance through trials; "this can indeed be
pretended but in no way can there be insight into it." Kant is surely
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right about this. Prima facie, there would seem to be no disproportion or
moral wrong if the virtuous were to receive happiness as a reward without having to endure painful trials.
A human analogy makes the problem for such a theodicy more vivid.
Let us assume that Kant is right and that virtue is deserving of happiness. Now imagine a high-school child who is particularly virtuous, and
that her parents are deliberating whether it is fitting to reward her. The
objection arises that her life has been largely lacking in significant difficulties, and that as a result virtue came too easily to her. As a remedy,
they cause her life to be more difficult by arranging to have her friends
desert her and by failing to inoculate her against a painful disease that
she will surely develop. Only under adverse conditions of this sort, they
believe, will she have the opportunity to merit a reward for her virtue.
First, it is obvious that the parents are morally wrong to cause her life
to be more difficult in these ways, and thus it would also be prima facie
morally wrong for God to perform analogous actions or omissions. But
second, to address Kant's specific concern, claiming that the child would
be worthy of reward only if she remained virtuous under increased hardship hardly seems plausible. That she should then deserve a greater
reward does not seem incredible, but even so it is unlikely that the parents' increasing her hardship could be justified on such a ground. Thus
the grounds for doubting the force of such a theodicy are very strong.
IV

The third and last series of theodicies endeavors to defend God against
the claim that wrongdoing goes unpunished. The first in this group argues
that wrongdoing is always accompanied by the punishment since "the
inner reproach of conscience torments the depraved even more harshly
than the Furies." Kant denies this on the grounds that the depraved individual does not have the kind of conscience that the virtuous person does;
"the depraved, if only he can escape the external floggings for his heinous
deeds, laughs at the scrupulousness of the honest who inwardly plague
themselves with self-inflicted rebukes" (Ak VIII 261).
The second of these theodicies contends that "it is a property of virtue
that it should wrestle with adversities (among which is the pain that the
virtuous must suffer through comparison of his own unhappiness with
the happiness of the depraved), and sufferings only serve to enhance the
value of virtue" (Ak VIII 261). Kant replies that these ills might be in
moral harmony with virtue if they precede or accompany virtue as its
"whetting stone," but then only if "at least the end of life crowns virtue
and punishes the depraved," for otherwise "suffering seems to have
occurred to the virtuous, not so that his virtue should be pure, but
because it was pure" and this is contrary to any concept of justice that we
can form" (Ak VIII 262).
The third theodicy in this group claims that in a future world "each
will receive that which his deeds here below are worthy of according to
moral judgment." Kant's answer is that we cannot know, theoretically,
that such a world will obtain. Experience provides us with no evidence
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that it will; "For what else does human reason have as a guide for its
theoretical conjecture except natural law ... how can it expect-since even
for it the way of things according to the order of nature is a wise one
here--that in a future world this way would be unwise according to the
same laws?" (Ak VIII 262). Kant agrees that we have a moral interest in
believing that in a future world each will receive his due, but since there
is no evidence for such a belief's being true, it cannot be employed in the
service of theodicy.
It seems to me that Kant is clearly right in his appraisal of the first
two theodicies in this series. It is implausible that morally evil people, if
they are not punished by an external force, suffer pangs of conscience in
proportion to their wrongdoing, and the thesis that suffering enhances
the value of virtue is obscure at best. On the last issue, however, if it is
theologically plausible that God punishes wrongdoing and rewards
virtue in a future life, then the lack of such settlements in this life seems
an insufficient reason to reject this sort of theodicy. The fact that there is
no empirical justification for this claim is a strike against it, but whether
it is determinative depends on what other sources for theological belief
are available-an issue that we must pass over here.
V

All these failed theodicies strive to vindicate "the moral wisdom in
world-government against the doubts raised against it on the basis of
what the experience of the world teaches" (Ak VIII 263). But all such
attempts at theodicy could be dismissed and replaced with a different
strategy, one which tries to show that human reason is incapable of
knowing the nature of any relationship between the moral wisdom in
world government and the world of experience:
But if perchance in time more solid grounds can't be found for
the vindication of [the moral wisdom in world-governmentlfor absolving the accused wisdom, not (as up until now) merely
ab instantia [i.e. without explanatory groundsl-this, at the same
time, still remains undecided, if we do not manage to demonstrate with certainty that our reason is absolutely incapable of
insight into the relation in which a world, as we might ever
know it through experience, stands to the highest wisdom; for
then all further attempts of an alleged human wisdom [would
bel completely dismissed. That thus at least a negative wisdom,
namely the insight into the necessary limitation of our presumptions with respect to that which is too high for us, is reachable
for us-that must yet be proven, to bring this trial for ever to an
end, and this may very well be done. (Ak VIII 263).Hi
Kant, then, aims to develop a new type of theodicy. Let us call this a
negative theodicy, as opposed to the positive theodicies, which by contrast
actually attempt to explain how the evils in the world are compatible
with the existence of God-and all of which Kant thinks are failures.
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To show that our cognitive faculties are limited in such a way as to
make it impossible for us to comprehend the relation between God and
the world of experience, Kant makes a distinction between artistic wisdom (Kunstweisheit) and moral wisdom (moralischen Weisheit) of a creator.
Artistic wisdom (in the essay on theodicy) is required for designing the
natural world, while moral wisdom is required for fashioning a world in
accordance with moral criteria. Kant thinks that we can not see how it is
that artistic wisdom and moral wisdom can coexist in a sensible world,
for the following reason:
For to be a creature and, as a natural being, merely the result of
the will of the creator; yet to be capable of responsibility as a
freely acting being (one which has a will independent of external influence and possibly opposed to the latter in a variety of
ways); but again, to consider one's own deed at the same time
also as the effect of a higher being-this is a combination of concepts which we must indeed think together in the idea of a
world and of a highest good, but which can be intuited only by
one who penetrates to the cognition of the supersensible (intelligible) world and sees the manner in which this grounds the sensible world. The proof of the world-author's moral wisdom in
the sensible world can be founded only on this insight-for the
sensible world presents but the appearance of that other
world-and that is an insight to which no mortal can attain. (Ak
VIII 263-4)
In Kant's view, artistic wisdom would be the cause of the natural aspect

(the empirical character (A546/B574» of our actions, and he thinks that
this natural aspect is a component of a deterministic system. Moral wisdom would result in a world that features morally responsible beings, as
well as the eventual realization of the highest good-happiness in accordance with virtue. Moral responsibility, according to Kant, requires
transcendental freedom, the ability of a self to cause an action without
being causally determined to cause itY What we cannot understand in
this picture is how, as a result of moral wisdom, we can be the transcendentally free causes of the natural aspects of our actions, and at the same
time those aspects be the result of an artistic wisdom, let alone one that
sets nature up to be deterministic. In the Antinomy of the Critique of
Pure Reason Kant had argued that there is no logical contradiction
involved in our choices being transcendentally free and at the same time
the sensible consequences of our choices being deterministic. But there
Kant also argued that we cannot explain how these two factors are compatible, and he continues to advocate that position here.
This account fails to provide a satisfying vindication of the claim that
human reason is incapable of comprehending the nature of any relationship between moral wisdom of the world government and the world of
experience. This is because Kant's account of what we fail to understand is too idiosyncratic. The puzzle he raises is an artifact of maintaining both an indeterminist notion of free action and determinism about
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the natural world. Most theistic incompatibilists would reject Kant's
natural determinism. Most theistic compatibilists would deny that
God's determining everything undermines the claim that humans have
free choice. Neither of these groups would admit that Kant has indicated a feature of the relation between God and the world which we cannot
genuinely comprehend.
However, the thesis that we cannot understand the relation between
God and the world is not unique to the essay on theodicy. Rather, it is
one of the central claims in Kant's discussion of teleology in the Critique
of Judgment. There he contends that the only kind of explanation we can
understand for the special nature of biological organisms involves a God
who designs them purposively, in accordance with the way in which we
understand the notion of purposiveness. But he also argues that our
inability to explain these features of the universe in any way other than
by our notion of purposiveness is a mere artifact of the nature of human
cognition. Consequently, we are constrained by our cognitive constitution to understand the relation between God and the world in one particular way, but at the same time we can see that this relation could be
very different from how we understand it to be. Let us examine Kant's
claims in detail to see if they can sustain his particular version of a negative theodicy.
VI

Kant's negative theodicy requires that he undermine the view that
God's connection to the world of experience is purposive in the way that
we understand this relation, which in turn involves arguing for two theses, both of which are discussed at length in the Critique of Judgment.
The first is that although we know that there are phenomena in nature
that we cannot explain mechanistically, and that the only explanation for
these phenomena we can in any sense understand is teleological, we
cannot know whether these teleological explanations are true, and the
extent to which we understand such explanations is actually quite limited. Arguing for this thesis requires showing that the teleological argument for the existence of God is not successful. For if it were, it would
establish determinatively that there is a God whose relation to the world
is purposive on analogy with the relation of human designers to artifacts, i.e., purposive in the way that we understand it. The second thesis
is that we can catch an intellectual glimpse of at least one kind of possible relation between God and the world other than one that is purposive
in the way we understand it, for this will show that there could be a God
whose relation to the world of experience we cannot understand.
Let us begin by examining Kant's claim that the only explanation we
can conceive for certain natural phenomena is teleological. Central to
his discussion of the conception of purpose in the Critique of Judgment is
a distinction between two kinds of judgment. The power of judgment
(Urteilskraft), first of all, is the ability to think the particular as contained
under a universal-a universal rule, principle, or law. If the universal is
"given," Kant says, then the judgment that subsumes the particular
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under it is determinative. (For Kant there are two sorts of given universals: those whose legitimate applicability to experience is secured
because they have been derived from experience in a certain way, and
those which have their source in the subject and for which there is a
transcendental deduction.) But if the universal is not given, and only
the particular is, and if the judgment has to find a universal concept for
the particular, then the judgment is reflective (Ak V 179). In determinative judgment, a given universal concept is applied to particulars. When
judgment is reflective, by contrast, no given concept serves as a general
mode in which particulars are represented, and thus the understanding
is motivated to seek a non-given universal to provide such a general
mode. Furthermore, we can know only that given concepts apply legitimately to experience, and not that the universals that the understanding
finds for reflective judgment so apply (Ak V 179-80).
For Kant, explanation involves judgment. Many explanations of natural phenomena, such as the mechanistic ones, proceed by determinative judgment. But some of our explanations of natural phenomena-or
biological organisms, in particular-must be teleological rather than
mechanistic, and will involve reflective judgment. The feature of these
organisms that is most resistant to mechanistic explanation is that "it is
both cause and effect of itself," a feature that, in his terminology, make it
a natural purpose. Here Kant has three characteristics in mind. First, biological organisms, as species, are self-producing; "with regard to its
species the tree produces itself: within its species, it is both cause and
effect, both generating and being generated by itself ceaselessly, thus
preserving itself as a species" (Ak V 371). The members of a species, by
continually reproducing themselves, cause the continuation of that
species. Second, Kant argues that there is a sense in which a biological
organism produces itself as an individual when it grows. Biological
growth is importantly distinct from mechanistic increase, for "the matter
that the tree assimilates is first processed by it until the matter has the
quality particular to the species, a quality that the natural mechanism
outside the plant cannot supply, and the tree continues to develop itself
by means of a material that in its composition is the tree's own product"
(Ak V 371). When a biological organism grows it doesn't simply add
matter as it is received from the outside. Rather, the organism infuses
this matter with its own specific form. And thus, with regard to its form
a biological organism causes its own growth. Third, biological organisms are self-producing in the sense that "there is a mutual dependence
between the preservation of one part and that of the others" (Ak V 371).
The leaves of a tree sustain the existence of its other parts but are also
sustained by the rest of the tree; here "we must think of each part as an
organ that produces the other parts (so that each reciprocally produces
the other)" (Ak V 374).
In Kant's conception, the reason that we cannot account for biological
organisms mechanistically is that in the domain of the sort of mechanistic explanation we can understand nothing is ever both cause and effect
of itself. Watches, for example, do not cause the continuation of the
watch species by reproducing themselves, they do not cause their own
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growth with respect to their form, and although their parts are there for
the sake of each other, they do not produce each other. Most significant
is the fact that an organized being has the power to impart form to itself,
and this nothing that we are able to explain mechanistically can have;
"for a machine has only motive force. But an organized being has within
it formative force, and a formative force that this being imparts to the
kinds of matter that lack it (thereby organizing them)" (Ak V 374).
Kant thinks that given our cognitive capacities we could never produce (good) mechanistic explanations for biological organisms:
For it is quite certain that in terms of merely mechanical principles of nature we cannot even adequately become familiar with,
much less explain, organized beings and how they are internally
possible. So certain is this that we may boldly state that it is
absurd for human beings even to attempt it, or to hope that perhaps some day another Newton might arise who would explain
to us, in terms of natural laws unordered by any intention, how
even a mere blade of grass is produced. Rather we must deny
that human beings have such insight.
Nevertheless, Kant does not want to state categorically that there could
be no mechanistic explanation for biological organisms; "On the other
hand, it would be also be too presumptuous for us to judge that... there
simply could not be in nature a hidden basis adequate to make organized
beings possible without an underlying intention (but through the mechanism of nature). For where would we have obtained such knowledge?"
(Ak V 400. cf 388).
Kant's views on these issues are not unreasonable, especially given
that Darwinian evolutionary theory was not available to him. There is a
prima facie implausibility to the suggestion that purposiveness in nature
can be explained mechanistically. But why does Kant not conclude that
explanation by way of purpose is the best scientific hypothesis, and thus
proceeds by determinative judgment and establishes genuine knowledge in this area? This is, after all, roughly the claim of the tradition in
teleological theology from Newton and Boyle onwards. What Kant
needs is a positive argument that casts into doubt a teleological explanation for the nature of biological organisms-one that undermines the
claim that the judgments of such an explanation are determinative. This
would be a significant accomplishment, especially given his own view
that when biological organisms are at issue, explanation by purposiveness is the only one we can in any sense comprehend.
VII

Let us therefore turn to Kant's contention that although the only
explanation for biological organisms that we can in any sense understand is teleological, we cannot know whether these teleological explanations-the theistic one in particular-are true, and that our understanding of such explanations is rather limited. In Kant's view, explain-
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ing biological organisms by purposes can take two forms. Either the
purposiveness is grounded in matter or it is grounded in something
beyond the material world. Against the first Kant argues that we neither
have an a priori nor an empirical way to determine even whether living
and purposive matter is a possibility (Ak V 394-5). Aristotelianism
endows matter with purposiveness, but this is a view Kant believes to
lack a sufficient basis. The alternative is to ground purposiveness in
something beyond the material world, and here the theistic hypothesis
springs to mind. On this issue teleological theologians have relied on an
analogy with human production of artifacts. Kant acknowledges that
this analogy provides us with a concept of causality through purposes
that has objective reality (i.e. legitimately applies to experience). But the
analogy fails in a crucial respect:
But the concept of a natural causality in terms of the rule of purposes-and even more so the concept of a being which is the
original basis of nature, viz., a being such as cannot at all be
given us in experience-while thinkable without contradiction,
is nevertheless inadequate for dogmatic determinations. For we
cannot derive such a concept from experience, nor is it required
to make experience possible; and hence we have nothing that
could assure us that the concept has objective reality. (Ak V 397)
It is fundamental to the view developed in the Critique of Pure Reason

that we have two ways of showing that a concept has objective reality,
by either an empirical deduction or by a transcendental deduction. In
an empirical deduction we demonstrate the legitimate applicability of a
concept to experience by showing that it has been derived from experience. In a transcendental deduction we establish that a concept has this
legitimate applicability by showing that experience, in particular some
very general fact about it, would not be possible unless the concept were
to apply. 12 In this passage Kant is claiming that the concept of a divine
purposive cause of biological organisms cannot be shown to have objective reality, for this cannot be shown in either of the two ways available
to us. Consequently, the possible attempts to provide teleological explanations for biological organisms cannot be adequately grounded.
Thus, although the only explanation for biological organisms that we
can in any sense comprehend is teleological, we cannot determine that
any such explanation is true. But furthermore, our comprehension of
such teleological explanations is not very substantial. First, we have no
insight into the causal powers by which God would design biological
organisms; "for we do not know at all how that being acts, and what its
ideas are that are supposed to contain the principles by which natural
beings are possible" (Ak V 410).13 Second, not only do we lack knowledge of supersensible causal powers, but our thoughts about them are
deficient in content: "with this kind of explanation we stray into the
transcendent, where our cognition of nature cannot follow us and where
reason is reduced to poetic raving, even though reason's foremost vocation is to prevent precisely that" (Ak V 410).
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One should note that Kant also cites the problem of evil as an objection to the teleological argument. The ancients, he argues, cannot be
blamed for their conceptions of limited deities because, although they
found reasons for assuming the existence of purposive superhuman
existence "they also found that-at least as far as we can see-in this
world good and bad, purposive and counterpurposive are thoroughly
mixed; and they could not take the liberty of nonetheless secretly assuming underlying wise and beneficent purposes, of which they saw no
proof" (Ak V 439). Furthermore, in a summary of criticisms of the teleological argument Kant claims:
But once we have nothing left as a basis for the concept of this
original being except empirical principles, taken from what
actual connections in terms of purposes [are found] in the
world: first, we are at a loss about the discordance, as far as the
unity of a purpose is concerned, displayed by nature in many
examples; second, the concept of a single intelligent cause, as
this concept is justified by mere experience, will never be determinate enough for any theology that is to be of any <theoretical
or practical) use whatsoever" (Ak V 440, cf 451).
There are facts about our experience that provide counterevidence to the
existence of a God who acts purposively, at least in the way we understand it, and we have no way of reconciling this counterevidence with
traditional theology.
VIII

The central feature of the first component of Kant's negative theodicy
is his claim that we can neither establish as true nor have more than a
limited understanding of an explanation for the nature of biological
organisms in terms of divine purposes. The second component involves
showing that we can catch an intellectual glimpse of at least one kind of
possible relation between God and the world of experience other than
purposiveness. For Kant, supporting this claim is important for establishing that there could be a God whose relation to the world we cannot
understand. His tactics here are well-chosen. The claim that the relation
between God and the world could be different from the only way in
which we can understand it is better supported if we have some sense of
an alternative than if we do not. Furthermore, this argument is what
differentiates Kant from Demea, who asserts without argument that we
do not understand the relation between God and the world.
Although the only explanation for biological organisms that we can in
any sense comprehend is one that involves purposiveness in their production, this fact is just a "peculiarity of our understanding" (Ak V 405).
This is the claim that Kant sets out to establish in §77 of the Critique of

Judgment:
Hence this distinguishing feature of the idea of a natural pur-
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pose concerns a peculiarity of our (human) understanding in
relation to the power of judgment and its reflection on things of
nature. But if that is so, then we must here be presupposing the
idea of some possible understanding different from the human
one (just as, in the Critique of Pure Reason, we had to have in
mind a possible different intuition if we wanted to consider ours
as a special kind, namely, as an intuition for which objects count
only as appearances). Only by presupposing this idea can we
say that because of the special characteristics of our understanding must we consider certain natural products, as to [how] they
are possible, as having been produced intentionally and as purposes. [And we do say this] though without implying that there
must actually be a special cause that determines on the basis of
the presentation of a purpose, i.e., without implying that the
basis that makes such products of nature possible could not be
found, even by an understanding different from (higher than)
the human one, in the very mechanism of nature, i.e., in a causal
connection that does not necessarily presuppose an understanding as cause. (Ak V 405-6)

Kant begins by attempting to discover some contingency in our understanding that would support his claim. This he finds by investigating
the relation between universals and particulars in our way of judging.
When we judge that a particular falls under a universal, he says, the universal does not determine, i.e. fix, the character of the particular that
falls under it. Rather, the particulars that fall under a universal can have
many different characteristics that are not determined by the universal
at issue:
We find this contingency quite naturally in the particular that
judgment has to bring under the universal supplied by the concepts of the understanding. For the universal supplied by our
(human) understanding does not determine the particular;
therefore even if different things agree in a common characteristic (Merkmale), the variety of ways in which they may come
before our perception is contingent. For our understanding is a
power of concepts, i.e., a discursive understanding, so that it
must indeed be contingent for it as to what the character and all
the variety of the particular may be that can be given to it in
nature and that can be brought under its concepts (fiir den es
freilich zufiillig sein mufl, welcherlei und wie sehr verschieden das
Besolldere sein mag, das ihm in der Natur gegeben werden und das
unter seine Begriffe gebracht werden kann). (Ak V 406)
Kant's point about our understanding is a reflection of the fact that we
are passive in the sensory aspect of our experience, and hence with
respect to a significant component of the material for our judgments.
Because of this passivity, our conceptualizing activity does not determine the nature of the sensed characteristics of the objects of experience.
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In Kant's view, this fact about our understanding has significant implications when the universals are laws of nature. It is difficult for us to
formulate laws that harmonize with our sensory experience, and this
results partly from the possibility of a contrast between our formulations
of laws and the passively received material they are meant to capture.
By contrast, we can think a wholly active intuitive understanding which
is not dependent on passive presentation of particulars as material for its
conceptualizing and judging activity. We cannot thoroughly grasp how
such an understanding works-that is part of Kant's point here-but its
central feature is that by means of its universals it completely determines
or fixes the nature of the particulars. The reason such an understanding
can perform such a feat is that for it to understand a particular by means
of a universal is the very same thing as it is to create that particular (d.
B138-9). (This raises the issue of what its universals are like, which we
shall examine in a moment.) Hence the difficulty we can sometimes face
in making universals and particulars match up would not arise for an
intuitive understanding. Similarly, for a mind of that sort, by contrast
with ours, there is no difficulty in formulating laws that harmonize with
the particulars of experience; "for such an understanding there would
not be that contingency in the way that nature's products harmonize
with the understanding in terms of particular laws" (Ak V 4(6).
This difference in cognition has implications for a type of universal
especially at issue in this discussion, a plan or design for something. In
the way we understand purposiveness, a designer first grasps a plan for
a finished product, and subsequently she arranges the raw materials in
accord with this plan. In the more abstract terminology that Kant uses
in this discussion, we understand that a designer first forms a conception of a whole, and then she arranges the parts in accordance with this
conception. A complementary feature of our ordinary understanding of
purposiveness is that we think of any whole we produce as dependent
on its parts for its nature and existence. Although according to our
understanding, the character and combination of the parts are dependent on the designer's conception of the whole, the whole itself is dependent on the parts for its nature and existence.
On the issue of purposiveness the intuitive understanding contrasts
with ours in a number of respects, which Kant summarizes as follows:
Our understanding has the peculiarity that when it cognizes,
e.g., the cause of a product, it must proceed from the analytically
universal to the particular (i.e., from concepts to the empirical
intuition that is given); consequently the understanding determines nothing regarding the diversity of the particular... But we
can also conceive of an understanding that, unlike ours, is not
discursive but intuitive, and hence proceeds from the synthetically universal (the intuition of the whole as a whole) to the particular, i.e., from the whole to the parts. Hence such an understanding as well as its presentation of the whole has no contingency in
the combination of the parts in order to make a determinate
form of the whole possible. Our understanding, on the other
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hand, requires this contingency, because it must start from the
parts taken as bases-which are thought of as universal-for
different possible forms that are to be subsumed under these
bases as consequences. [We], given the character of our understanding, can regard a real whole of nature only as the joint
effect of the motive forces of the parts. Let us suppose, then,
that we try to present, not the possibility of the whole as dependent on the parts (which would conform to our discursive
understanding), but the possibility of the parts, in their character and combination, as dependent on the whole, so that we
would be following the standard set by intuitive (archetypal)
understanding. (Ak V 407)

This is a difficult passage, but here is one way to interpret Kant's reasoning. When we human beings think, we use analytic universals, which
are concepts. For Kant, a concept is essentially general in the sense that it
applies to an object by virtue of a feature that other objects can also possess (A68/B93). The intuitive understanding, by contrast, employs
instead the synthetic universal, which is an intuition- a representation
of a particular, and one that does not apply to a particular by virtue of a
feature other particulars can also have (A68/B93). The distinctive feature of a synthetic universal is that it is an intuition of a whole as a whole.
This means that it is a representation of a particular whole as independent of and prior to its parts. 14
Given the nature of our own understanding, we cannot represent
wholes this way, but we must represent them as dependent on their
parts. For the intuitive understanding, however, the dependency relation is the other way around. Such an understanding represents wholes
independently of and prior to parts. Accordingly, when the explanation
of the existence and nature of a thing is at issue, the intuitive understanding represents wholes as determining and producing the existence
and nature of parts. By contrast, our understanding cannot represent
wholes as having such a function.
Moreover, according to the way we understand things, whether the
parts do in fact come together to fit the designer's conception of the
whole is a contingent matter. But for an understanding for whom the
whole determines the parts, whether the parts come together to fit the
whole is not a contingent matter. Rather, the existence, nature, and relations of the parts proceed with necessity from the whole.
Directly following passage quoted above, Kant intimates that we cannot genuinely understand how the parts of a natural entity could be
dependent on the whole. The closest we can come, he argues, is to
understand the parts as dependent on the conception of the whole-which
is the crucial ingredient in our notion of purposiveness:
The only way that we can represent the possibility of the parts
as dependent on the whole is by having the representation of
[the] whole contain the basis that makes possible the form of
that whole as well as the connection of the parts required to
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[make] this [form possible]. Hence such a whole would be an
effect, a product, the representation of which is regarded as the
cause that makes the product possible. But the product of a
cause that determines its effect merely on the basis of the presentation of that effect is called a purpose. (Ak V 407-8)
From this claim Kant draws the conclusion that our inability to comprehend explanations of biological organisms in any way other than by purposiveness is a mere artifact of the way we happen to think. "It follows
from this that the fact that we present [certain] products of nature as
possible only in terms of a kind of causality that differs from the causality of natural laws pertaining to matter, namely, the causality of purposes
and final causes, is merely a consequence of the special character of our
understanding" (Ak V 408). In the view of a kind of understanding different from ours, of which we have now caught an intellectual glimpse,
biological organisms are explained not by their parts resulting from a
conception of those things as wholes, but rather by their parts resulting
from the wholes themselves. Such an explanation, Kant argues, does not
involve purposiveness at all.
IX
It may be tempting to read §77 of the Critique of Judgment, which we
have just examined, as an argument that biological organisms might
have been produced mechanistically and not theistically, despite our
inability to genuinely understand how this could be. The problem with
this interpretation is that for the intuitive understanding the relation
between wholes and parts is not at all the ordinary mechanistic relation.
At the same time this relation between wholes and parts recalls the connection between God and the world in Spinoza's picture of the universe.
In Spinoza's view, there is only one substance, which is God, and thus
God is the whole universe. IS The parts of the world do not in any sense
determine the whole, but the whole determines, with necessity, the existence and nature of the parts. In addition, God's production of the parts
of the universe is not preceded by his understanding of them, as it
would be if God were purposive (at least on our model). Rather, God's
understanding and production of the parts of the universe are exactly
the same process.
Spinoza's picture of reality is very similar to the representation of the
universe that the intuitive understanding would have. For such an
understanding, the universe as a whole would determine with necessity
the nature and existence of all the parts of the universe. Moreover, the
whole that would determine the parts of the universe could quite readily be identified with the entity whose creation of the parts would be
identical to its representing the whole as a whole. Furthermore, since
the intuitive understanding's representation of the universe as a whole
would at the same time be its creation, for it there would be no design of
the universe that precedes its creation, and thus no purposiveness, at
least on our model.
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Kant represents Spinoza as striving to provide an explanation of
divine purposiveness, but despite this aim, as indeed denying the purposiveness of God in the last analysis:
Spinozism does not accomplish what it tries to accomplish. It
tries to offer a basis that will explain why things of nature are
connected in terms of purposes (which it does not deny), but all
it points to is the unity of the subject in which they all inhere.
But even if Spinozism be granted that the beings of the world
exist in this way, this does not yet make the [resulting] ontological unity the unity of purpose, and certainly does not allow us to
grasp the latter unity. For the unity of a purpose is a very special kind of unity. It does not follow at all from a connection of
things (beings of the world) in one subject (the original being),
but always carries with it reference to a cause that has understanding. Rather, even if we were to unite all these things in a simple
subject, the unity will amount to reference to a purpose only if
we also think of these things, first, as inner effect of the substance
as a cause, and second, as having been caused by this substance
through its understanding. Unless these formal conditions are
met, all unity is mere natural necessity ... (Ak V 393, d. 421,440)
Perhaps not all of Kant's claims about Spinoza's system are accurate.
For Spinoza, efficiently causing merges into following logically, and since
everything follows logically from the divine nature, everything is indeed
caused by the divine nature as welp6 But Kant points out, correctly, that
in Spinoza's picture the parts of the universe are not caused by way of
God's conception of a universe, but rather by the divine nature without
the mediation of a conception of the whole. The universe is not created
in accordance with a divine plan, and is thus, in a natural sense, without
a divine purpose.
Kant thinks that two conditions must be satisfied if something is to
display genuine purposiveness. First, there must be a unity in the
source of the purpose, and this requirement he believes is met by
Spinoza's view in virtue of the fact that the source is a simple substance
(Ak V 421). But the second condition is that we must think of the unity
of purpose lias intelligence; and the relation of this substance to those natural forms we must think of as a causality (because of the contingency
we find in everything that we think possible only as a purpose)" (Ak V
421). That which is the unity of the purpose must be a genuine cause of
the natural forms-the natural forms cannot simply logically follow
from that entity, and the causation must proceed by means of a conception of that which is caused, or in other words, by a plan. Spinoza's conception does not meet this second condition.
Does Kant maintain that the absence of divine purposiveness gives us
a theoretical or a practical reason to reject Spinoza's conception of God's
relation to the world? On the side of a negative answer to this question,
Kant clearly thinks of God as an intuitive understanding (B71-2), and
since he conceives of God as omniscient and error-free, reality as it is in
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itself would have to be as God cognizes it. In addition, this conception
would in a sense solve the problem of evil, as it does for Spinoza, by
claiming that God is not good because he has no purposes or ends, and
thus no purposes for anything we might want to call good)7 This
Spinozan picture, however, can be accepted only at great cost to theistic
religion as traditionally understood, and indeed as Kant understands it.
The main problem is that it would leave the world without any divine
purposes at all, when in Kant's view we must, in the interests of the
moral life, believe in a divine purpose to bring about the highest goodhappiness in accord with virtue.
Nevertheless, it is significant that Kant consistently denies that we can
have theoretical knowledge of God and of divine purposes, and that he
further claims that the existence of God and the highest good as a divine
purpose are only assumptions we must make for practical, moral ends:
If the supreme principle of all moral laws is a postulate, then the
possibility of [achieving] their highest object [the final purpose],
and hence also the condition[s: God and the immortality of the
soul] under which [alone] we can conceive of that possibility,
[are] postulated with it at the same time. But that does not make
our cognition of that possibility either knowledge or opinion of
the existence and character of these conditions, which would be
a theoretical way of cognizing them; but it is merely an assumption that we make and are commanded to make in a practical
respect: for the moral use of our reason. (Ak V 470)

One might suggest that Kant, like Spinoza, really believes that there are
no divine purposes, while at the same time he claims that we must
believe that there are divine purposes in order to live the moral life. But
this interpretation is implausible because the position it attributes to
Kant would recommend an inconsistency among beliefs-in violation of
his own condition on practically justified belief. More likely, Kant is
using the conception of an intuitive understanding only to undermine
our confidence that purposiveness on our model is the only possible
relation between God and the world. And if so, he is not asserting that
the world is as it would be for an intuitive understanding, and not as
Spinoza thinks it to be. Still, claiming that in Kant's view reality might
not be as it is for an intuitive understanding does involve some strain.
But it does rescue the recommendations of his moral theology, and that
is a very weighty consideration.
In summary, then, Kant argues that the only way to harmonize the
existence of God with the counterpurposive is to claim that we cannot
understand the relation between God and the world of experience.
Thus, despite our only way of understanding what God's relation to the
world is like, it might not be purposive in the way that we understand it,
and it might not be purposive at all. In the essay on theodicy, his argument that we lack this ability was weak because it presupposed his controversial metaphysics of freedom and determinism. But his defense in
the Critique of Judgment is more interesting. First, he contests the ade-
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quacy of the teleological argument, which aims to establish divine purposiveness on the basis of the need to explain the special nature of biological organisms. Second, he suggests that from the point of view of an
intuitive understanding, the relation between God and the world of
experience might not be as we comprehend it. Thus, despite our inability to understand any relation between God and the world of experience
other than a purposive one, we can see that this conception might well
be inaccurate. By this means latitude is provided for a relation between
God and the world that solves the problem of evil.
What are the outlines of God's relation to the world of experience that
Kant's discussion suggests? This relation wm not purposive in the way
that we understand it, for the goodness of a God that is purposive in this
way cannot be reconciled with the evils that we encounter in the world.
But at the same time this relation must be capable of the role that purposiveness on our model has in Kant's moral theology. For otherwise
there will be too deep a conflict between the beliefs about God that
moral theology requires and the view we are now sketching. Human
beings cannot comprehend any relation between God and the world of
experience that satisfies these conditions. But, according to Kant, we can
show that this fact may well be due to our cognitive limitations, and not
because a relation that meets these criteria is impossible.
We are left with a sketch of a conception of God and his relation to the
world of experience that, insofar as we can grasp it, features no logical
contradiction. Given our cognitive limitations, we cannot determine
whether such a God is really possible, let alone whether he really exists.
But in Kant's view, the negative theodicy is nonetheless good enough to
allow for a pragmatic, practical faith in God-and he does not believe that
a theistic attitude with more epistemic weight than that can be justified.

x
There is room to dispute whether Kant's classification of theodicies is
complete, or whether his criticisms of various positive theodicies are
convincing. Nevertheless, he is certainly not alone in thinking that no
positive theodicy ever devised adequately explains how an omniscient,
omnipotent, wholly good being could coexist with the evils that have
occurred on earth. Thus for many, a theology of ignorance of the sort
that Kant advocates could well be intriguing and attractive. One drawback is that such a theodicy restricts any clear understanding of God,
and this might well prove a hindrance to a relationship with God modelled on personal, human relationships. But the advantage is that it
holds out the possibility of a relationship between God and the world of
experience that provides a resolution to the problem of evil, the most
serious obstacle to theistic belief.
The lack of a positive theodicy threatens to undermine any claims to
theoretical knowledge of God. Kant arguably concurs with this assessment. But he does not endorse any claims to theoretical knowledge of
God, but only to practical faith. Kant's negative theodicy plays a significant role in his attempt to secure the rationality of this practical faith.
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Plausibly, such a project might also prove useful in grounding the legitimacy of theological attitudes such as hope and commitment. If the
coherence of a commitment seemed ruled out to us, it would readily fall
to the charge of irrationality. On the other hand, if we were unable to
comprehend how a commitment could be coherent, but at the same time
could show that our inability might be due to a limitation in our cognitive capacities, it would be likely to fare better."

University of Vermont
NOTES
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